pub struct Keypair {
    pub secret: SecretKey,
    pub public: PublicKey,
}
Expand description

A Ristretto Schnorr keypair.

Fields

secret: SecretKey

The secret half of this keypair.

public: PublicKey

The public half of this keypair.

Implementations

Serialize Keypair to bytes.

Returns

A byte array [u8; KEYPAIR_LENGTH] consisting of first a SecretKey serialized cannonically, and next the Ristterro PublicKey

Examples
use schnorrkel::{Keypair, KEYPAIR_LENGTH};

let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::generate();
let bytes: [u8; KEYPAIR_LENGTH] = keypair.to_bytes();
let keypair_too = Keypair::from_bytes(&bytes[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&bytes[..], & keypair_too.to_bytes()[..]);

Deserialize a Keypair from bytes.

Inputs
  • bytes: an &[u8] consisting of byte representations of first a SecretKey and then the corresponding ristretto PublicKey.
Examples
use schnorrkel::{Keypair, KEYPAIR_LENGTH};
use hex_literal::hex;

// TODO: Fix test vector
// let keypair_bytes = hex!("28b0ae221c6bb06856b287f60d7ea0d98552ea5a16db16956849aa371db3eb51fd190cce74df356432b410bd64682309d6dedb27c76845daf388557cbac3ca3446ebddef8cd9bb167dc30878d7113b7e168e6f0646beffd77d69d39bad76b47a");
// let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes[..]).unwrap();
// assert_eq!(&keypair_bytes[..], & keypair.to_bytes()[..]);
Returns

A Result whose okay value is an EdDSA Keypair or whose error value is an SignatureError describing the error that occurred.

Serialize Keypair to bytes with Ed25519 secret key format.

Returns

A byte array [u8; KEYPAIR_LENGTH] consisting of first a SecretKey serialized like Ed25519, and next the Ristterro PublicKey

Deserialize a Keypair from bytes with Ed25519 style SecretKey format.

Inputs
  • bytes: an &[u8] representing the scalar for the secret key, and a compressed Ristretto point, both as bytes.
Examples
use schnorrkel::{Keypair, KEYPAIR_LENGTH};
use hex_literal::hex;

let keypair_bytes = hex!("28b0ae221c6bb06856b287f60d7ea0d98552ea5a16db16956849aa371db3eb51fd190cce74df356432b410bd64682309d6dedb27c76845daf388557cbac3ca3446ebddef8cd9bb167dc30878d7113b7e168e6f0646beffd77d69d39bad76b47a");
let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::from_half_ed25519_bytes(&keypair_bytes[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&keypair_bytes[..], & keypair.to_half_ed25519_bytes()[..]);
Returns

A Result whose okay value is an EdDSA Keypair or whose error value is an SignatureError describing the error that occurred.

Generate a Ristretto Schnorr Keypair directly, bypassing the MiniSecretKey layer.

Example

use rand::{Rng, rngs::OsRng};
use schnorrkel::Keypair;
use schnorrkel::Signature;

let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::generate_with(OsRng);
Input

A CSPRNG with a fill_bytes() method, e.g. rand_chacha::ChaChaRng.

We generate a SecretKey directly bypassing MiniSecretKey, so our secret keys do not satisfy the high bit “clamping” impoised on Ed25519 keys.

Generate a Ristretto Schnorr Keypair directly, from a user suplied csprng, bypassing the MiniSecretKey layer.

Sign a transcript with this keypair’s secret key.

Requires a SigningTranscript, normally created from a SigningContext and a message. Returns a Schnorr signature.

Examples

Internally, we manage signature transcripts using a 128 bit secure STROBE construction based on Keccak, which itself is extremly fast and secure. You might however influence performance or security by prehashing your message, like

use schnorrkel::{Signature,Keypair};
use rand::prelude::*; // ThreadRng,thread_rng
use sha3::Shake128;
use sha3::digest::{Input};

let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::generate_with(&mut csprng);
let message: &[u8] = b"All I want is to pet all of the dogs.";

// Create a hash digest object and feed it the message:
let prehashed = Shake128::default().chain(message);

We require a “context” string for all signatures, which should be chosen judiciously for your project. It should represent the role the signature plays in your application. If you use the context in two purposes, and the same key, then a signature for one purpose can be substituted for the other.

let ctx = signing_context(b"My Signing Context");

let sig: Signature = keypair.sign(ctx.xof(prehashed));

Sign a message with this keypair’s secret key.

Verify a signature by keypair’s public key on a transcript.

Requires a SigningTranscript, normally created from a SigningContext and a message, as well as the signature to be verified.

Examples
use schnorrkel::{Keypair,Signature,signing_context};
use rand::prelude::*; // ThreadRng,thread_rng

let mut csprng: ThreadRng = thread_rng();
let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::generate_with(&mut csprng);
let message: &[u8] = b"All I want is to pet all of the dogs.";

let ctx = signing_context(b"Some context string");

let sig: Signature = keypair.sign(ctx.bytes(message));

assert!( keypair.public.verify(ctx.bytes(message), &sig).is_ok() );

Verify a signature by keypair’s public key on a message.

Sign a message with this SecretKey, but doublecheck the result.

Sign a message with this SecretKey, but doublecheck the result.

Evaluate the VRF on the given transcript.

Produce DLEQ proof.

We assume the VRFInOut paramater has been computed correctly by multiplying every input point by self.secret, like by using one of the vrf_create_* methods on SecretKey. If so, we produce a proof that this multiplication was done correctly.

Run VRF on one single input transcript, producing the outpus and correspodning short proof.

There are schemes like Ouroboros Praos in which nodes evaluate VRFs repeatedly until they win some contest. In these case, you should probably use vrf_sign_n_check to gain access to the VRFInOut from vrf_create_hash first, and then avoid computing the proof whenever you do not win.

Run VRF on one single input transcript and an extra message transcript, producing the outpus and correspodning short proof.

Run VRF on one single input transcript, producing the outpus and correspodning short proof only if the result first passes some check.

There are schemes like Ouroboros Praos in which nodes evaluate VRFs repeatedly until they win some contest. In these case, you might use this function to short circuit computing the full proof.

Run VRF on one single input transcript, producing the outpus and correspodning short proof only if the result first passes some check, which itself returns an extra message transcript.

Run VRF on several input transcripts, producing their outputs and a common short proof.

We merge the VRF outputs using variable time arithmetic, so if even the hash of the message being signed is sensitive then you might reimplement some constant time variant.

Run VRF on several input transcripts and an extra message transcript, producing their outputs and a common short proof.

We merge the VRF outputs using variable time arithmetic, so if even the hash of the message being signed is sensitive then you might reimplement some constant time variant.

Vaguely BIP32-like “hard” derivation of a MiniSecretKey from a SecretKey

We do not envision any “good reasons” why these “hard” derivations should ever be used after the soft Derivation trait. We similarly do not believe hard derivations make any sense for ChainCodes or ExtendedKeys types. Yet, some existing BIP32 workflows might do these things, due to BIP32’s de facto stnadardization and poor design. In consequence, we provide this method to do “hard” derivations in a way that should work with all BIP32 workflows and any permissible mutations of SecretKey. This means only that we hash the SecretKey’s scalar, but not its nonce becuase the secret key remains valid if the nonce is changed.

Derive a secret key and new chain code from a key pair and chain code.

We expect the trait methods of Keypair as Derivation to be more useful since signing anything requires the public key too.

Issue an ECQV implicit certificate

Aside from the issuing Keypair supplied as self, you provide both (1) a SigningTranscript called t that incorporates both the context and the certificate requester’s identity, and (2) the seed_public_key supplied by the certificate recipient in their certificate request. We return an ECQVCertSecret which the issuer sent to the certificate requester, ans from which the certificate requester derives their certified key pair.

Issue an ECQV Implicit Certificate for yourself

We can issue an implicit certificate to ourselves if we merely want to certify an associated public key. We should prefer this option over “hierarchical deterministic” key derivation because compromizing the resulting secret key does not compromize the issuer’s secret key.

In this case, we avoid the entire interactive protocol described by issue_ecqv_cert and accept_ecqv_cert by hiding it an all managment of the ephemeral Keypair inside this function.

Aside from the issuing secret key supplied as self, you provide only a digest h that incorporates any context and metadata pertaining to the issued key.

Initialize a multi-signature aka cosignature protocol run.

We borrow the keypair here to discurage keeping too many copies of the private key, but the MuSig::new method can create an owned version, or use Rc or Arc.

Trait Implementations

Returns a copy of the value. Read more

Performs copy-assignment from source. Read more

Formats the value using the given formatter. Read more

Derive key with subkey identified by a byte array presented via a SigningTranscript, and a chain code. Read more

Derive key with subkey identified by a byte array and a chain code. We do not include a context here becuase the chain code could serve this purpose. Read more

Derive key with subkey identified by a byte array and a chain code, and with external ranodmnesses. Read more

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer. Read more

Executes the destructor for this type. Read more

Performs the conversion.

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer. Read more

Zero out this object from memory using Rust intrinsics which ensure the zeroization operation is not “optimized away” by the compiler. Read more

Auto Trait Implementations

Blanket Implementations

Gets the TypeId of self. Read more

Immutably borrows from an owned value. Read more

Mutably borrows from an owned value. Read more

Returns the argument unchanged.

Calls U::from(self).

That is, this conversion is whatever the implementation of From<T> for U chooses to do.

Should always be Self

The resulting type after obtaining ownership.

Creates owned data from borrowed data, usually by cloning. Read more

🔬 This is a nightly-only experimental API. (toowned_clone_into)

Uses borrowed data to replace owned data, usually by cloning. Read more

The type returned in the event of a conversion error.

Performs the conversion.

The type returned in the event of a conversion error.

Performs the conversion.